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FISCAL CONSERVATISM OR FISCAL PRUDENCE? 
LOCAL SPENDING AND TAXATION IN INDEPENDENT COUNCILS 
Arthur Midwinter and John Moxen 
Introduction 
The demise of "Independents" in local government has long been 
forecast, yet the evidence from recent elections is that their death will be a 
slow, lingering process. Reorganisation of local government gave a fillip to the 
reduction in the number of Independents, as local political systems were 
merged and party politics increased but, since 1977, only modest decline has 
taken place, particularly in Scotland. 
" .... .independents are more important at the district council level in 
Scotland than in England and Wales: after the 1974 elections they 
controlled twenty-one of the fifty-three district councils (39.6%) and 
were the largest single category on one other district council. The 1977 
district elections in Scotland did not fundamentally change the pattern 
of independent predominance in the rural areas. Independents also 
controlled in 1977 the three most rural regional councils and the three 
all-purpose island authorities. "(I). 
A decade later, in 1988, councillors of the Independent philosophy 
constituted the second largest group at the Scottish district elections, although 
in absolute terms, the numbers of Independent councillors declined<2l. The 
philosophy of independence "has deep roots in the political development of 
Britain"<3l, but its survival as a dominant political culture is mainly in rural 
areas. Independent politics are non-partisan, whereby candidates are chosen 
on their personal qualities to represent the community. Dyer and Sewel 
observed that Labour candidates in Peterhead 'ran up against the refusal of the 
electorate to "vote-the-ticket" '(4). This permeates the council chamber where 
'consensus' is also valued. Independent councillors regard their areas as 
having common interests. Consensus decision-making is the norm, and 
divisions are few<5l. As Dyer wryly observed: 
"independent politics is essentially administration without strategy, and 
policy can be defined as the approach taken to each item as it presents 
itself. "(6) 
Studies of the pre-reorganisation authorities found finance committees to 
be the key mechanism of integration. Dyer argues that: 
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"Probably the most important councillor was the convenor of finance in 
that his committee exercised some kind of scrutiny over 
expenditure .......... " 
as it had 
"responsibility for ensuring that strong cases were advanced in defence 
of any request for appropriations .......... " 
but that: 
"it lacked the expertise to evaluate both the need for and performance of 
a particular service." 
Bealey and Sewel's research support this view: 
"Finance acted as a resource committee. Recommendations by the 
committees involved with the spending of money came before it and, 
perhaps most importantly, the convenor of the Finance Committee, the 
Burgh Treasurer, through the Committee recommended the annual rate 
levy to the Council.. ........ " 
and moreover, 
"Becoming Finance Convenor, or Burgh Treasurer, was recognised by 
Councillors as becoming a Iynchpin in local government decision-
making. In the cost-conscious Peterhead Council an observation from 
the Treasurer to the effect that a proposed project had significant 
expenditure and hence rating implications was an effective kiss of 
death."(?) 
Dyer and Sewel's study of the new Banff and Buchan District Council 
identify 'retrenchment' as a central political value. This was reflected in low 
tax, low expenditure and high rents policies in municipal politics before 
reorganisation, and this fiscal conservatism was reinforced after 
reorganisation. 
Such studies provide valuable insights to local political behaviour in non-
partisan councils. They have, however, serious limitations as the basis for the 
development of a more general theory of independent politics. Firstly, they 
tend mainly to be case studies. Thus we have detailed analysis of actors and 
issues in specific authorities, but little serious comparative analysis. 
Evaluating the consequences of keeping party politics out of local government 
requires a basis for comparison. Dyer and Sewel, for example, make 
observations about Banff and Buchan's position in the rates league table, but 
provide no analysis of the service consequences of this in contrast to other 
councils. They also note that Banff and Buchan's budgets over a three year 
period have all been within government guidelines, and that only five other 
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councils out of the 53 Scottish districts had a similar record. They argue: 
"Retrenchment is such a widely shared value, among officials and 
councillors alike, that only rarely does it have to be made explicit ....... " 
"The reason for the acceptance of the guideline figure is determination 
to avoid the grant penalty. The idea that every£ of expenditure will cost 
the ratepayers more than a£ is so offensive to the value of retrenchment 
that it is never seriously contemplated. "(8) 
When one looks at Banff and Buchan's record over a number of years, it 
does not look so clearly an example of retrenchment ethic. Indeed, the very 
year after the Dyer and Sewel study, the guideline was exceeded and penalty 
incurred. Over a ten year period, the council exceeded the guideline on five 
years out of ten, once by as much as 63%. In short, the acceptability of the 
guideline, and the subsequent rates increase will also depend on the service 
consequences of these decisions. There is now considerable evidence that 
councils of all persuasions have been adopting at least 'policy maintenance' 
strategies over the decade of retrenchment, whilst others have incurred 
growth(9l. 
Secondly, interpretations of the impact of Independent politics need to 
distinguish between counties and small towns. It is interesting that in both 
rural counties dominated by landowners and small towns dominated by small 
businesses, retrenchment emerges as a dominant value. Yet both had 
distinctive social systems. Dyer's study of Kincardineshire makes this point. 
He saw traditional values preserving elements of traditional leadership in rural 
areas in the form of the 'lairds' (landlords). The County Council consisted 
largely of social leaders and their representatives, on the basis of hierarchical 
values in the social system, whilst the burghs lacked oligarchies and natural 
leaders. It may be that these reflect the power of property as, for much of the 
century, the franchise reflected property. The extension of democracy and the 
welfare state has however created a situation of flux and a further major 
change occurred with the reorganisation of local government. The 
amalgamation of old authorities and the creation of larger wards served to 
erode the particularism of the relationship between elector and councillor. It 
resulted in the demise of the landlords. For example, only one laird survived as 
a councillor following the reorganisation of local government in the Scottish 
Highlands. Whilst the value of community remained dominant, members 
certainly did and do distinguish between the 'lairds and the people'. (Private 
interview with the author). 
These limitations of scope, time, and interpretation suggest that a more 
comprehensive analysis of fiscal behaviour in independent councils is 
required. Whilst Independents may concur on the undesirability of partisan 
politics, it seems questionable that the retrenchment ethic would necessarily 
apply to all Independents. Dislike of parties is not the same thing as dislike of 
politics. The ideology of low spending and low rates found in several studies is, 
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of course, a form of fiscal conservatism. Yet Independents are by no means all 
political conservatives. Indeed, many such Independents are consistently 
critical of the services they inherited from the older county councils which were 
dominated by the landed class. In short, it would be wrong to equate 
Independent politics with fiscal conservatism without more systematic 
analysis, and we seek to undertake such analysis in the remainder of this paper. 
Local Fiscal Behaviour Since Reorganisation 
Most studies of Independent politics focus on the pre-reorganisation local 
authorities. Reorganisation of local government, as noted above, ended the 
geographical basis of the traditional local power structure. Whereas the old 
councils had limited functions and resources, the new regions in Scotland had 
an impressive array of functions, and considerable rate raising capacity. 
Our empirical data is drawn mainly from Scottish regional and island 
councils. These authorities are responsible for about 90% of local expenditure 
in Scotland, the districts having a more limited role. They provide a useful 
focus for us as they provide examples of the demise and survival of 
Independent politics. In Grampian and Tayside, the pattern of urban politics 
developed in the cities of Aberdeen and Dundee became the dominant form in 
post-reorganisation regional politics. Several erstwhile Independents adopted 
party labels under the new system. 
In the mainland rural areas, Borders, Dumfries and Galloway and 
Highland, and the three Islands Councils, Independents remain by far the 
largest grouping of councillors, although a trend to partisanship, usually in the 
form of an opposition, can be found. They provide a distinctive form of local 
politics. As Leach et al have observed: 
"In the Independent councils, what is distinctive is that the committees 
and the full council remain the areas where decisions are taken ....... The 
dominant characteristics of the process of committee decision-making in 
these Independent authorities is informality." 
The Widdicombe researchers also found considerable Support for this 
form of politics. 
"None of the Independent councils felt a stronger executive style akin to 
the cabinet concept was appropriate to local government. It would 
certainly be unacceptable to the Independents, as it is clearly 
contradictory to their philosophy of free decision-making based on the 
merits of the issue". 
This research revealed the survival of Independent values into the post-
reorganisation period. Independents continue to 'see themselves as solid 
citizens behaving sensibly in the best interests' of their communities, involved 
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in the 'efficient management of local affairs', without 'needless rhetoric and 
posturing'. (JO)_ 
Using Scottish regions and islands, therefore, allows comprehensive 
comparison of fiscal behaviour in Independent councils with the rest of 
Scotland. Secondly, for most of this period, a Conservative Government has 
been in power and promoting a brand of fiscal conservatism not unlike the low 
rate, low expenditure ideology identified in the aforementioned studies. For 
most ofthe post-reorganisation period, councils have operated in conditions of 
fiscal stress; i.e. faced with the rising cost of providing existing services and the 
declining availability of existing resources in the form of government grants. In 
the past fifteen years, central government has acquired new powers of 
financial intervention and control, including current expenditure guidelines, 
the application of cash limits to government grants, power of general 
abatement of grant, limits on housing revenue account expenditure, and rate-
capping(!!). 
If there is a general ethic of retrenchment, one would expect Independent 
councils to respond positively to a strategy to reduce expenditure. While 
younger, more assertive urban councillors readily engaged in conflict with the 
Conservative Government over their expenditure, Independent councils 
remained aloof from what was essentially a high profile, ideological clash<12l. 
But does this mean they complied with government, and did they have a 
retrenchment ethic? 
There are three ways of examining the fiscal behaviour of Independent 
councils. Firstly by examining their expenditure performance since 1975, 
second by examining their performance against government guidelines and, 
finally, their performance over rates. 
At reorganisation, the new councils expenditure very much reflected the 
inherited budgets from the old authorities. One dominant characteristic of 
these authorities, however, generally overlooked in previous analysis of their 
fiscal behaviour, is their low rating base and consequent heavy dependence on 
government grant. 
With a government in power seeking expenditure reductions, and the 
gearing effect (ratio of grant to rates in local income) such that increases in 
expenditure above guideline could only be achieved at high cost to local 
ratepayers, a dominant ethic of retrenchment would lead us to predict low 
spending. 
Table 1 shows that the Independent councils were not low spenders in 
1975-6. 
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Table 1 
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They were in fact high spending councils, but this reflected their high 
needs and costs, and low resources which provided them with high levels of 
grant. In the next ten years, faced with declining grant, they remained high 
spenders, engaging in resource substitution to maintain and, in most cases, to 
improve in real terms their services. From Table 2, we can see that by 1986-7, 
the four Highland and Islands councils continued to incur high levels of net 
expenditure, and this had grown above the Scottish average after the election 
of the Conservative Government in 1979. Of course, the special case of 
Shetland, and to a lesser extent Orkney, should be noted where high 
expenditure was incurred to service the oil industry. In the period 1975-8, the 
Labour Government was also pursuing expenditure reductions and the 
Independent councils, with the exception of Orkney and Shetland, grew below 
average. Since 1982, however, that trend has changed. Both Highland and 
Western Isles voted big increases in the 1978-82 period, and in the 1982-6 
councils, spending in all six grew faster than the Scottish average. This 
occurred during a period of rapidly declining grant. Part of the explanation 
may be found in the decline in importance of councillors from the pre-
reorganisation period<13l. No clear evidence of a retrenchment ethic emerges, 
but there is an increasing tendency for above average spending growth. 
Several studies have pointed to the importance of government guidelines 
in local fiscal behaviour as spending in excess of them can result in both grant 
penalties and rate-capping. Since 1983, grant penalties have been directly 
related to the degree of overspending. The development of guidelines has 
been characterised by guideline instability, with four different methods of 
calculation used in the first six years. Since 1983, guidelines have been based 
on a combination of authorities' client group based needs assessment, and a 
stability factor to take account of authorities' existing budgets. This serves to 
bring guidelines closer to budgets<14l 
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Table 2 



































Source: Rating Review- The periods selected fall between regional elections. 
In Table 3 we examine the performance of authorities against these 
guidelines, for it could be argued that the spending growth identified earlier is 
not necessarily inconsistent with government strategy as it varies the targets 
given to authorities. This table reveals a wide range of budgetary behaviour 
between Independent councils. Dumfries and Galloway, and to a lesser extent 
Borders, have regularly budgeted close to guidelines. Highland Region began 
spending less than guidelines, then its excess grew consistently until 1982-3, 
before declining until it too budgets at or around guidelines. Western Isles 
shows a similar pattern, but with a high degree of excess between 1979 and 
1983. 
Table3 
Guideline Performance by Independent Councils Since 1978 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
% % % % % % % % % 
Border -1.9 -0.7 +0.3 +2.7 +1.0 - -0.1 
Dumries -3.0 -0.5 -0.6 -0.1 
Highland -1.9 +3.7 +2.7 +3.1 +12.1 +10.4 +3.1 -0.1 
Orkney +25.7 +33.9 +20.3 +40.1 +25.8 +15.3 -0.2 -0.8 
Shetland +8.9 +42.1 +66.4 +72.4 +79.5 +46.1 +3.1 
Western Isles -1.6 +3.1 +8.2 8.1 +13.4 +17.6 +0.7 
Scotland +3.3 +4.6 +9.2 +8.3 +4.7 +4.2 +3.2 +3.9 
Source: Rating Review and Scottish Office Finance Circulars. 
We would argue that these figures do not support the retrenchment thesis. 
It could be argued that their behaviour since 1984 is a confirmation of this 
ethic, as when penalties were linked directly to guideline excesses, all six fell in 
line. In response to that, we would argue that government adjustments 
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produced more attainable guidelines for the higher spenders (increasing 
Shetland's by about 70% in two years) and thus reached an accommodation 
with them. Moreover, since then, most of the rural councils have had relative 
increases in their guidelines. Finally, whilst we accept that guideline 
compliance became commonplace after the linking of penalties to excesses, 
and that this could be as high as two pounds for every pound spent above 
guidelines, we could argue that this is evidence of fiscal prudence rather than 
fiscal conservatism. In short, whilst both central and local government moved 
towards each other, the government made considerable accommodation with 
local spending levels. Had the authorities had deeply held retrenchment 
ethics, these changes would not have been necessary. 
A similar pattern occurred over rate fund contributions to council housing 
earlier. Previously councils could spend what they wished on this issue. The 
Conservative Government introduced a housing expenditure limit, which 
reduced authorities' capital allocations pro-rata with overspending of the 
expenditure limit. Whereas, before this, high levels of spending could be 
found in many Independent councils, most of them met the limit thereafter 
rather than lose capital allocations, unlike most Labour councils who 
continued to subsidise rents and lose capital allocations<15l. 
The reason we describe this as fiscal prudence is that it maximises 
expenditure and income to the local area. Independent councils in general 
argue there is little point in exceeding guidelines if the net result is a loss of 
resources, and therefore activity, from the local economy. 
Their responses over guidelines and the housing limits are therefore 
consistent with and not necessarily evidence of fiscal conservatism. Councils 
were clearly happy to spend above targets until such strategies brought 
penalties. In the absence of ideological conflict, such behaviour was 
unnecessary and brought adverse consequences to local economic activity. 
Indeed, many rural councils actively pursued grantsmanship strategies to 
increase their guidelines and their capital allocations06l. Independent 
councils' behaviour varied, with the Highlands and Islands councils frequently 
overspending prior to 1983, then aligning budgets with guidelines to avoid 
penalties thereafter. But, once again, no clear systematic evidence of a 
common retrenchment ethic exists. Moreover, this strategy became 
commonplace by 1987, when 40 councils in total met their guidelines. (t?) 
Finally, we examine the rating consequences of these expenditure 
decisions. Earlier studies suggest that concern for the achievement of a low 
rate was a dominant one in Independent councils. If that predisposition is 
reinforced with pressures of fiscal stress, one would expect to find Independent 
council consistently setting low rates. 
The measure we have chosen is the growth in rate-borne expenditure. 
Whilst rate poundage levels are a direct measure of fiscal behaviour, they are 
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capable of manipulation. Inherited deficits on balances from previous years 
can affect the tax level in any given year. Secondly, authorities with growing 
economies, such as Orkney, Shetland or Grampian, can find their capacity to 
restrain their rate poundages increases with growth in the total rateable values 
in their areas. (They raised more for a penny rate and, if no expenditure 
increases occurs, taxation levels will fall). Finally, we have also included 
growth of net expenditure, and grant loss, to examine the effect of fiscal stress. 
Table 4 shows that a substantial shift in the financing of local services took 
place in the period since 1975. The Independent councils have all levied 
increases in rate-borne expenditure above the Scottish average, and four of the 
six have voted spending increases above the Scottish averages, during a period 
when four of these councils faced grant reductions greater than the Scottish 
·average. Far from behaving as the retrenchment ethic would predict, the 
councils have clearly sought to protect and improve councils at the cost of rates 
increases. 
Table4 
Changes in Net Expenditure, Rate-born Expenditure and Grant Levels 
Growth in Rate- Growth in 




























In 1989-90, the Government introduced a new system of local taxation 
known as the community charge or poll tax. It is basically a simple per capita 
tax, with a rebate system for people on low income. The objective of the 
reform is stated to be promotion of financial discipline in local government 
through the electorate, on the assumption that if we all have to pay for 
services, then there will be an effective reduction in demand for services, and 
thus expenditure. 
In rural Scotland, however, the tax has resulted in high tax increases in 
remote areas, where low valued properties resulted in low rates under the old 
system with the consequence that campaigns for equal services have arisen. 
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Secondly, the fiscal prudence ethic was in part a response to grant penalties 
and the withdrawal of such penalties on the introduction of the poll tax 
removed some of the constraints on expenditure. 
The first grant settlement under the community charge was a generous 
one. The Government produced a set of community charge estimates as 
targets for local authorities. We examined the performance of the six 
independent councils in terms of expenditure and taxation. Four of the six 
increased expenditure by more than the Scottish average and two were close to 
it. Big increases were budgeted for in Highland, Orkney and Western Isles. 
Five of the six also set tax levels well in excess of Government estimates. 
TableS 


















Source: Statistics derived from Rating Review 
Conclusions 
Community Charge Excess 









The ethic of retrenchment is a value of particular Independents, not a 
general ethic. Evidence from a number of studies shows that non-partisanship 
cannot be equated with fiscal conservatism per se. Rather, Independent 
politics should be seen more simply as the rejection of party organisation in 
local government. That is, non-partisan should not be equated with non-
political in the broader sense. Local governments take decisions about 
resource allocation, service provision, and local taxation, and these are the 
essence of politics. In the post-reorganisation period, and in particular since 
1978, Independent councils in general have increased their spending levels 
relative to the average, but even between themselves, considerable variation 
exists, with Borders and Dumfries displaying more fiscal conservatism than 
the councils in the Highlands and Islands. 
Indeed, rural Scotland has increasingly returned non-Conservative MPs 
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and MEPs. It would be surprising therefore, with the mix of political attitudes 
found among councillors, if their budget outputs conformed to the stereotype 
of fiscal conservatism. Independent politics contain more variety than has 
hitherto been acknowledged. For example, Jordan found three contrasting 
attitudes to the financing of council housing to assist oil development in the 
Inverness area<18l. 
Moreover, following the reform of local government finance in 1989, 
Independent councils were in the forefront of the disagreement with the 
government over community charge levels. Borders and Highland Regions 
were subject to fierce criticism from the Scottish Office for setting tax levels in 
excess of government predictions. Ironically, this tax reform which was 
intended to increase pressure on councillors to spend less looks as if it will have 
the opposite effect in rural politics<19l. 
The label 'Independent politics' tells us more about how affairs will be 
conducted in such councils than what the outcomes of their deliberations will 
be. Independents are by no means all fiscal conservatives. Local fiscal 
behaviour is varied, and reflective of the individual political values of the 
councillors themselves. If there is a general pattern, it is what we have called 
fiscal prudence ethic, which emphasises the maximisation of expenditure and 
grants, and avoids political confrontation with the government, yet has 
facilitated service expansion in a decade of retrenchment. 
Arthur Midwinter, University of Strathclyde. 
John Moxen, Robert Gordon's Institute of Technology, Aberdeen. 
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